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Abstract 
This paper will try to explain the nature of European actorness, the mode of European policy-making, 
and the formation of common European interests. What are the pillars of EU power and how does the 
EU engage in power politics? Has Europe’s normative power of attraction vanished as a consequence 
of the Euro-crisis? Today Europe is no longer seen as a generator of security and well-being. Its laws 
and norms are no longer seen as generating efficiency and justice. And the crisis has split Europeans 
apart making it difficult for them to bring their respective national interests onto line in either 
economic or security fields. 
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The Euro-crisis has caused collateral damage in many fields, including foreign policy. This article will 
endeavour to assess the damage.  
Foreign policy is about many different things, but in its essence it is about exercising power. The 
Euro-crisis has not caused any major diplomatic dispute between the EU and its competitors and 
partners. However, it is fair to assume that it has undermined the EU’s power in both material and 
ideational terms. This is why the focus of this paper is Europe’s power and European power politics in 
the time of crisis. Of course, different actors weld power in different ways. Some rely chiefly on 
material sticks and carrots; others prefer to rely on their sex appeal. Some use foreign policy for 
territorial or economic gain; others attempt to influence the rules of international conduct or to shape 
notions of legitimacy. Foreign policy choices are partly conditioned by capabilities, and partly by 
interests and geostrategic visions. The European Union is not a state, and its policies are often more 
about diffusing differences among the 27 member states than about projecting power abroad. In fact, 
the very notion of abroad is rather fuzzy in the EU’s case, and so are the notions of interest, 
government, and policy instruments. The terms power and power politics are seldom used in the 
European discourse. European integration is said to overcome the power politics’ syndrome. This is 
easier said than done, especially where foreign policy is concerned.  
This paper will try to explain the nature of European actorness, the mode of European policy-
making, and the formation of common European interests. What are the pillars of EU power and how 
does the EU engage in power politics? More specifically, has Europe’s normative power of attraction 
vanished as a consequence of the Euro-crisis?  
The EU as a foreign policy actor 
The EU is a peculiar international actor, a kind of “unidentified political object” to use Jacques 
Delors’ expression. The Union lacks some of the essential structural features of a state. It has no 
effective monopoly over legitimate means of coercion. It has no clearly defined centre of authority. Its 
territory is not fixed. Its geographical, administrative, economic and cultural borders diverge. It is a 
polity without a coherent demos, a power without an identifiable purpose, and a geopolitical entity 
without defined territorial limits.  
European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is a misnomer because EU member states 
are permitted to act outside the EU framework, as, in fact, they frequently do, either within the United 
Nations’ framework or via the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Council 
of Europe or NATO. European foreign and security policies are often carried out by formal or 
informal coalitions of the willing, by contact groups or through bilateral initiatives.  
However, it would be a mistake to dismiss the EU as having no role in foreign policy. Over the 
years the EU’s framework has become the most important centre of European foreign and security 
policy debates, where national policies meet and part. Today, diplomats from EU countries meet about 
100 times a year to consider political and security issues, and adopt over 100 joint statements, 
communiqués and declarations annually. Individual EU member states usually speak and act “in the 
name of Europe”, if not through Europe itself. In the field of external trade the Union is already a 
unified actor with the European Commission in charge of negotiating all crucial trade agreements. 
Over the past decade the Union has also begun to acquire its own military capability and is now in the 
process of acquiring its own diplomatic service.  
In summary, the Union is clearly a vibrant international actor without assuming the role of a state. 
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The EU’s power politics 
The EU does not exercise power in the same way as nation states. It is a largely civilian power 
promoting universal norms in its vast neighbourhood and beyond. The EU’s greatest asset is the power 
of example. The EU represents a unique project congruent with the deeper forces of modernization 
and cross-border integration. It contributes to international order, development and cooperation by 
spreading institutional structures and rules of legitimate behaviour.  
The set of norms and laws that guides the process of European integration has made Europe a 
model of prosperity and peace. The EU’s foreign policy rests on the assumption that export of these 
norms and laws can help others to emulate the European experience. This is not a mere benign 
exercise of power. Adopting EU norms and laws often implies severe domestic constrains on the EU’s 
partners all over the world. Some EU regulations on environment or food safety may appear to be 
mere technicalities, but their adoption often has major economic, if not political, implications for the 
countries targeted. Moreover, EU policy is chiefly guided by self-interest and not by altruistic 
concerns. The European public are keen to maintain their current standards of life, work, and health. 
Failure to export their standards to other countries would place European firms at a comparative 
economic disadvantage. The EU’s promotion of democracy and good governance can also be seen as 
intrusive and ideologically biased by those on the receiving end in, for instance, the Arab world or 
Asia-Pacific.  
The EU’s normative power goes hand in hand with its material capabilities. No economy in the 
world can ignore the EU with its nearly 500 million inhabitants, a quarter of the world’s GNP, and 
around 40 per cent of the world’s merchandise exports. Despite the crisis, the Euro is still the world’s 
second most important international reserve and trade currency, ensuring that the EU has a major 
influence globally. The EU is the world’s largest provider of developmental aid. In 2006 the EU paid 
out over 2 billion euros in aid, representing over 40 percent of official aid internationally.
1
  
When dealing with international partners, the EU has a comprehensive array of economic, legal, 
diplomatic and military instruments at its disposal. For instance, the EU together with the US produce 
around 80 per cent of international norms and standards that regulate global markets, including the 
Dollar and the Euro.
2
 China has already applied EU regulations to its motor industry and adopted EU 
food safety provisions. The GSM standard is used for mobile communications, cordless phones and 
technologies that are delivering broadband to tens of millions of customers globally.
3
  
Through various regulatory regimes, the EU is able to dictate to domestic actors across the world 
what they can and cannot produce if they want to export to the EU. EU regulatory regimes also impose 
extra-territorial scrutiny and arbitration tribunals on these actors. Consider, for instance, the European 
Court’s decision to effectively prohibit the merger of two US companies (General Motors and 
Honeywell Bull). The Microsoft case is another good example here.  
Needless to say, this norm-setting global record is not just a function of Europe’s unique 
intellectual capabilities, which it especially has in the field of law and governance, but is also a 
function of its enormous trade leverage.
4
 
                                                     
1
 “Council of the European Union: Humanitarian Aid,” Internet, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/eu-development-
policy-%28ec-wbesite%29/main-themes/humanitarian-aid.aspx?lang=en (date accessed: 4 November 2011). 
2
 See André Sapir, “Europe and the global economy,” in Fragmented Power: Europe and the Global Economy, André 
Sapir, ed., (Brussels: Bruegel Books, 2007), p. 12. 
3
 See “Europe in the World” Communication from the Commission to the European Council of June 2006, Document No 
2438, Brussels, June 2006, p. 3. 
4
 See Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaidis, “The European Union as a conflicted trade power,” Journal of European 
Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 6 (2006), pp. 902-21. 
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The EU also exercises power in the field of security, but again in a different way from traditional 
nation states. EU peace-keeping operations have multiplied in recent years, reaching different and 
often remote places such as East Timor, Congo, Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Bosnia and 
Georgia.
5
 However, the political significance of the operations has been rather symbolic. The largest 
EU-led mission – European Union Force Chad/CAR – involved some 4,000 troops (half of them from 
France), but other missions have usually included no more than a few hundred if not a few dozen 
diplomats, policeman or observers. It is the EU’s contribution to securing peace in Europe itself that 
has been of greatest value. European integration has managed to link the ever-growing number of 
member states to each other in a tight institutional framework. Bloody wars were fought among these 
countries for centuries, and now the countries only fight diplomatic wars at successive meetings of the 
European Council. Put differently, the EU framework has institutionalized, if not pacified, inter-state 
relations in Europe. By exporting the European governance abroad, the EU hopes to pacify relations 
among its immediate neighbours in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Middle East and North Africa. This 
is why the Nobel Committee in Oslo awarded the 2012 Peace Prize to the EU for its historical role in 
“promoting reconciliation and peace.” After all, countries such as Bangladesh, Egypt or Nigeria have a 
better record of participation in traditional UN-led peace keeping operations than the EU. However, 
they are unable to structure, institutionalize and legitimate relations in their respective regions to the 
benefit of security and peace in the way that the EU has been able to. 
EU interest formation 
Power without purpose is meaningless, and the purpose is the function of interests. Interests in 
democracies are not a given, but result from a complex process of preference formation involving the 
public and its democratically elected representatives. Of course, culture and history play a role in this 
process of interest formations and so does the geostrategic position of a given actor. The EU does not 
really have any of this. It does not have a single public or demos, but 27 distinct demoi, each of them 
informed by a distinct history and culture. The EU’s geostrategic position is also hazy because EU 
borders shift frequently due to successive enlargements. The EU also lacks a fully-fledged democratic 
mechanism that would allow for a respectable degree of public deliberation across its territory. 
European parties are artificial constructs with strong national (and often partisan) undercurrents. The 
European Parliament lacks a sound legitimacy to aggregate political preferences and to make choices 
acceptable for the EU’s citizens across the entire continent. This is why European foreign policy has 
an intergovernmental nature; democratically elected leaders go to Brussels to negotiate the notion of 
the common European interests. This notion usually represents the lowest common denominator and is 
born through long and painful bargaining processes. Consequently, the EU is seldom able to respond 
quickly to any serious crisis because it first needs to work out the notion of its common interests in a 
given case. The President and High Representative for Foreign Affairs envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty 
have no powers to take key decisions on behalf of member states. Indeed, most decisions require the 
unanimity of all 27 member states.  
The coherence of the EU decision-making system is further undermined by the so called “pillar 
structure”, which separates trade and economics from foreign and security policy. Most foreign policy 
instruments are within the economic pillar or outside of the Union structure altogether. In other words, 
the Union does not only need to negotiate the notion of its common interests but also how much 
                                                     
5
 The EU has launched civilian missions to monitor implementation of the peace process in Aceh in Indonesia, support the 
stabilization process in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and support the Iraqi rule of law sector and the reform of 
Palestinian civil police. The EU contributes to building police capacity in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The EU is supporting policing elements of the African Union Missions in Sudan and is 
also contributing to the rule of law reform and border monitoring in Georgia. The on-going missions also include the 
EUPOL in Afghanistan, the EU border assistance mission to Moldova and Ukraine, and the civilian-military 
supporting action to AMIS II in Sudan. 
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member states contribute in both human and financial resources to ensure the agreed policies can be 
implemented. 
All this has serious implications for European power politics. The EU can hardly project power 
abroad in a strategic manner because strategy demands the ability to set clear objectives and an 
application of means to meet these objectives. On the other hand, the lack of a clear strategy makes 
Europe less vulnerable to accusations of pursuing its own selfish ambitions at the expense of others. 
This is why Europe is viewed with far less suspicion than America which tends to be balanced by 
strong actors and cheated by weak ones. 
The complex intergovernmental bargaining process required for EU decision-making prevents bold 
and quick actions but it also ensures that the Union does not take precipitous actions that it would later 
regret. It is difficult, for example, to imagine the Union taking a unanimous decision to invade Iraq. 
Moreover and more crucially, the extensive process of negotiations and bargaining helps the Union to 
diffuse internal conflicts over foreign affairs (and this is one of the EU’s most important tasks). 
Deliberation and reliance on consensus has its price, however, because it makes it difficult for the 
Union to exercise its power in an instrumental manner by bribing and punishing reluctant states. The 
EU is much better suited to creating institutional structures and setting up rules of legitimate behaviour 
than acting as an effective fire brigade when problems erupt abroad.  
In summary, the EU is well-suited to the sort of foreign policy advocated by Hugo Grotius or 
Immanuel Kant, but ill-suited to the policies of Niccolò Machiavelli or Thomas Hobbes. This is why 
the EU’s greatest asset is its ability to create a structural environment conducive to peace and 
cooperation. The EU is not good at managing crises, conducting secret negotiations or manipulating 
international institutions. 
The impact of the Euro-crisis 
First, the Euro-crisis has made the EU a destabilizing international factor. The crisis has put numerous 
economies around the world under enormous strain. The most immediate impact was felt in the 
periphery of the Euro-zone in Hungary and Latvia, but even such economic giants as China and the 
United States have been preoccupied by the possible negative implications of a Euro breakdown. In 
the past, the EU was perceived as a generator of stability and prosperity. Today, it is generating 
uncertainty and insecurity.  
Second, the Euro-crisis has tarnished Europe’s power of example. Several European economies 
appear to be insolvent and the common currency is under threat. The way Europe has been handling 
the crisis is also discouraging. The initial responses to the crisis were too much about austerity rather 
than growth, too much about sanctions rather than incentives, too much about top-down rigid rules 
rather than bottom-up initiative and accommodation. A rigid, stingy and oppressive EU is hardly a 
model an external actor would want to emulate.  
Third, the Euro-crisis has undermined the EU’s credentials as a setter of laws and norms. European 
treaties have been found inadequate and poorly observed. The crisis revealed the scale of cheating in 
such states as Greece, but Germany and France’s failure to live up to the stipulations of the Maastricht 
Treaty has also had a negative impact on Europe’s image as a trustworthy norms setter. Moreover, the 
management of the crisis has been conducted mainly with politics and economics in mind rather than 
law. True, under Germany’s insistence, the Union has adopted the so-called Fiscal Compact Treaty 
introducing national “debt breaks,” and a 1/20 rule by which countries face severe sanctions if they 
fail to reduce their excess debt by 5 per cent a year. However, this treaty has been seen by debtor 
countries as a symbol of legislating inequality and as such a poor foundation for the rule of law.  
Fourth, the Euro-crisis has pulled several EU states further apart from other EU states, 
complicating a process of joint European interest formation. A major cleavage has emerged between 
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the creditor states who proudly call themselves the “Triple A” countries and the debtor states labelled 
rather derogatorily as the “PIGS” (an acronym that formally refers to the economies of Portugal, 
Italy, Greece and Spain while “Triple A” refers to the superior rating awarded by major credit 
agencies). Another serious cleavage has emerged between those EU member states that are part of the 
Euro-zone and those outside it. What’s more all these groups are split still further into many sub-
groups, each fiercely arguing their partisan case. At stake is equal access to EU decision-making and 
resources. At stake is also mutual the trust needed to do business together, especially in difficult times. 
Foreign policy usually demands actions in difficult times but the Euro-crisis has caused member states 
to become suspicious of each other’s intentions and to have little confidence that their differences can 
be bridged by accommodation and compromise. This will obviously complicate any future process of 
common interests formation, especially if under pressure of external events and time.  
Fifth, the crisis has made the EU introverted and passive towards its external environment. Foreign 
policy preoccupations are now of secondary importance. European leaders are currently reluctant to 
devote as much time and resources to them as before the Euro-crisis. Europe’s passive response to the 
Arab Spring is a telling example here. Domestic financial pressures generated by the crisis have 
reduced the funds available for foreign policy and developmental aid. High profile normative stands 
on human rights are increasingly judged as too “costly” when dealing with states, most notably China, 
that could potentially alleviate Europe’s financial problems.  
Conclusions: power and foreign policy 
On the surface, European foreign policy does not seem to be particularly affected by the crisis. The 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs travels around the world meeting foreign officials. The 
European Council adopts resolutions dealing with numerous complex international issues. The 
Presidents of the European Commission and Council make speeches focussing on global and regional 
politics. It is only when we examine the EU’s foreign policy from the perspective of power and power 
politics that we see the devastating impact of the Euro-crisis. Today it sounds like a farce when the 
President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, proudly declares – “‘Without Europe, there 
would still have been an Arab Spring, but without us there will be no Arab summer!’6A few years ago 
Van Rompuy’s words could have sounded like a credible prospect and a promise of a tangible EU 
commitment to the cause of Arab development and democracy. Arab politicians would have known 
that behind the EU rhetoric there stood a power of example able to appeal to those constituencies they 
wished to attract. They would have believed that the EU’s quest to promote laws and norms was likely 
to benefit not just the EU but also themselves. They would have viewed the EU’s declarations of 
‘mutual accountability’ as fair and reliable.7 Yet, the EU’s recent treatment of the indebted states 
within the Euro-zone questions the EU’s commitment to fairness and solidarity. If the EU treats 
Greece and Portugal in a stingy and dictatorial manner, why should it behave any differently towards 
the Arab states? 
                                                     
6
 European Council, Remarks by Herman Van Rompuy President of the European Council at the European Parliament 
Conference of Presidents. EUCO 32/1/11 REV 1, Brussels, 28 June 2011a. 
7
 For a selection from the EU official discourse in which terms such as ‘deep democracy’, ‘mutual accountability’, and the 
‘3 Ms’ (money, market access and mobility) are developed, see: C. Ashton, The EU Wants 'Deep Democracy' to Take 
Root in Egypt and Tunisia,’ Guardian, (4 February 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/feb/04/egypt-
tunisia-eu-deep-democracy; European Commission , ‘Joint Communication to the European Council, the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – A 
Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’, COM(2011) 200 Final, Brussels, 8 
March 2011; European Union, ‘Speech of High Representative Catherine Ashton on Main Aspects and Basic Choices of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy’, A 179/11, Brussels, 11 May 
2011;S. Füle, ‘Revolutionising the European Neighbourhood Policy in Response to Tougher Mediterranean Revolutions’, 
SPEECH/11/436, Brussels, 14 June 2011. 
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The EU has never succeeded in acting strategically, rewarding friends and punishing foes. With its 
greatest asset the power of example, other actors wanted to look, talk and walk like the EU. However, 
today Europe is no longer seen as a generator of security and well-being. Its laws and norms are no 
longer seen as generating efficiency and justice. And the crisis has split Europeans apart making it 
difficult for them to bring their respective national interests onto line in either economic or security 
fields. An inward-looking Union obsessed with its own problems will be a very different international 
actor from the Union we learned to know over the past decades. Its foreign policy will be an empty 
shell as a consequence. 
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